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What happens to a resource community whose existence is entirely determined not just by the 
work they do, or the type of lives they choose to live, but rather by a faceless global industry, 
seemingly insatiable for its resource? What happens when that insatiable need suddenly 
stops? This paper will examine the town of Asbestos, Canada, which is the location of what 
was once the world’s largest opencast asbestos mine, the Jeffrey Mine. Central to the 
community’s economy, asbestos is a fibrous mineral that is found entwined in rock, and can 
be woven into, or added to, a seemingly-infinite amount of goods to make them fireproof and 
more durable. Indeed, asbestos can withstand heat up to 3000˚F. Historically, Asbestos was a 
single resource community, with the mine located at the centre of town, and operated by the 
American Johns-Manville Company (JM). As townspeople framed their lives around the 
mine—with residential and commercial streets branching from its crater-like1 presence—
global markets significantly impacted how they did so throughout the “boom years” of the 
asbestos industry, 1918-1983.   
 
The Jeffrey Mine produced 85 percent of the world’s supply of the fireproof mineral through 
much of the 20th century largely due to the unique nature of the land at what was to become 
Asbestos. While most asbestos deposits are found in linear veins shooting through layers of 
rock, often requiring several mines to access it all, the deposit at the town of Asbestos was 
circular, and created a rounded knoll absolutely full of the mineral. This meant that only one 
mine was needed to extract the valuable mineral, but it also meant that the people of Asbestos 
had built their community literally on top of a massive ore deposit. While the industry relied 
on the local population to extract the mineral, that very same local population also hindered 
market growth through the sheer fact of their presence on the land surrounding the mine. 
 
The nature of open cast mining is that it never remains stagnant, and the pit must always be 
expanded in order for workers to access more of the mineral. However, because the town of 
Asbestos was built around the Jeffrey Mine, this meant that each time JM expanded the limits 
of the pit, part of the community was consumed by it. Through analysing the 11 Jeffrey Mine 
expansions that occurred from 1928-1980, this paper will examine the fundamental local-
                                                          
1 The community often looked at the mine as a crater. For example, please see Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 21 
January 1981, p. 171 
global dilemma present in the town of Asbestos: international markets dictated when the 
Jeffrey Mine needed to be expanded, geology dictated where it should expanded, and the 
local population—so crucial to meeting these market demands and so knowledgeable of the 
mineral itself—needed to be close enough to do the required labour for the expansion and 
extraction of raw asbestos, but they needed to get out of the way of it. 
 
From 1928-1980, Asbestos became a “rolling” mining community. Townspeople moved 
homes, businesses, and other local facilities and infrastructure away from the edges of the 
Jeffrey Mine, but not far enough away that their properties were safe from future pit 
expansion. Johns-Manville was responsible for deciding when and how the Jeffrey Mine 
would expand, with little consideration for the local population: global markets and rising 
profits were what mattered most. While the community was French Canadian, JM employed 
Anglophone engineers and geologists to lead these expansions, removing any real agency 
from local workers or government. In examining this process, this paper will show how the 
tensions caused by this local-global dilemma were negotiated and experienced in the 
community. In doing so, it will trace the development of a strong local identity that was 
linked to the global asbestos industry that dictated the development of their land, as well as 
the resilience of mining communities in the face of adapting to day to day realities beyond 
their control.  
 
Being close to both work and civic life, the homes and businesses surrounding the Jeffrey 
Mine were actually some of the most desirable in Asbestos. This desirability contributed to 
townspeople’s willingness to accommodate the growing needs of the industry by dismantling 
their homes and moving them away from the edges of the mine. By tracing the local 
expansion of the Jeffrey Mine, this paper will also show the rise and fall of the global 
asbestos industry, so connected to the community that housed the largest mine in the world. 
From 1928, when this region of Canada produced 224,701 tons of raw asbestos out of the 
global 345,000 tons, to 1980, when it produced 1,004,025 tons out of the global 4,699,300 
tons, it was clear that asbestos was big business, and the community of Asbestos was central 
to it.  
 
The nature of asbestos mining meant that an open pit could be mined for decades before it 
required expansion. The rapidity in which the Jeffrey Mine reached its limits was largely 
determined by global demand for the mineral, as new uses for asbestos were developed each 
year. While it certainly was inconvenient to move your home every 5-10 years, locally the 
Jeffrey Mine was referred to affectionately as “the mine that ate the village,” and mine 
expansion usually meant the industry—and therefore the community—was booming. This 
was a place focused on the future, not the past, and it was prepared to make any sacrifice it 
needed to in order to guarantee success. This became especially important as the industry 
began to crumble as reports of the negative health effects of asbestos became well-known in 
the western world. However, at the start of the 20th century, the asbestos industry was 
beginning to boom, and the American Johns-Manville Co. helped facilitate an industrial 
revolution to the natural phenomenon that was the land at Asbestos.  
 
Positive Boom Years  
 
The Johns-Manville Co.2 took full control of the Jeffrey Mine in 1916, just as the asbestos 
industry was beginning to boom because of the mineral’s numerous wartime uses, including 
being used in soldier’s uniforms to protect them against fire on the front. JM was historically 
a manufacturer of materials used in the construction industry, and the fireproof mineral that 
could strengthen most products it was added to was central to the company’s growth. In fact, 
by 1898, the majority of the asbestos workers extracted from the Jeffrey Mine went directly 
to JM factories in the United States, and the company had become the largest manufacturer of 
asbestos-based products in the world.3 Investing in an asbestos mine—and an asbestos 
mining community—thus made good business sense for JM, especially as the company 
rightly anticipated the profits that could come from post-war reconstruction.   
 
Johns-Manville brought a “bigger is better” mentality to this small mining community, as 
well as a promise of permanence, and the local population quickly grew around the mine as 
the industry boomed in the interwar years. Asbestos was not the only town in the region that 
mined the mineral, but at the start of the 20th century, it was among the most undeveloped and 
unprofitable. This was largely because the companies that had operated it in the past lacked 
the geological knowledge to access the unusual deposit at its full potential.4 This was not a 
                                                          
2 The company was originally named the H.W. Johns-Manville Co., and did not officially become “Johns-Manville” until 
1930. However, because of its more recognizable name and because most studies of the industry refer to it as JM, this paper 
will exclusively refer to it as Johns-Manville for consistency.  
3 The Canadian Mining Review, vol. 12 (January 1893), p. 4. 
4 Indeed, the first owners of the Jeffrey Mine went bankrupt in 1892 despite the rise in demand for the mineral. Jessica van 
Horssen, A Town Called Asbestos: Environmental Contamination, Health, and Resilience in a Resource Community 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015). (Forthcoming) 
problem for JM, as the company had the funds to hire geologists and engineers who could 
understand the land at Asbestos in ways previous companies and even the local population 
could not. American money and connections revolutionized the land in Asbestos, and the 
Jeffrey Mine quickly became an efficient, quasi-natural machine, with spiralling benches 
winding from the bottom to the top, steam shovels, derricks, and, soon enough, a train 
transporting ore from the bottom of the pit to the nearby Grand Trunk Railway line.5 
 
Johns-Manville brought a “bigger is better” mentality to this small mining community, as 
well as a promise of permanence that previous mine owners could not guarantee. The local 
population quickly grew around the mine as the industry boomed in the interwar years, and 
both men and women found employment there. Everything—and everyone—in Asbestos 
became oriented towards, and devoted to, the mine and industry, which is often a precarious 
situation for single industry resource communities.6 Even for the merchants who operated 
local stores, JM provided the necessary salaries for local customers: the Jeffrey Mine was the 
reason for being in Asbestos, and without its continued development, the community would 
collapse. This devotion to, and perhaps even this faith or trust in the mine took root and 
changed as the community was swept through the various booms and busts of the global 
industry. 
 
This international market growth directly led to the necessary growth of the Jeffrey Mine 
itself, as with JM’s connections, it had quickly become central to the global industry. The 
company raised extraction levels at the pit to feed its vast network of processing plants 
throughout the United States, and these new rates rapidly consumed the land that separated 
the edges of the mine from the community. In 1923, Asbestos town council had given the 
company permission to “move” one of the major roads in the community by 66 feet to 
facilitate easier shipment of raw asbestos from the Jeffrey Mine to international processing 
plants, as local residents were getting in the way. The local government agreed to this move 
because it wanted to make industrial development of the land as easy as possible for JM, as 
                                                          
5 Environmental Historian Richard A. Rajala has written about the timber industry transforming forests into giant open air 
factories, and his perspective on the industrialization of natural resources inspires this piece. Richard A. Rajala, Clearcutting 
the Pacific Rainforest: Production, Science, and Regulation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), p. 30. 
6 For example, please see Michael A. Amundson, Yellowcake Towns: Uranium Mining Communities in the American West 
(Denver: University Press of Colorado, 2004), Charlie Angus and Brit Griffin, We Lived a Life and then Some: The Life, 
Death, and Life of a Mining Town (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1996), Larry Lankton, Cradle to Grave: Life, Work, and 
Death at the Lake Superior Copper Mines (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Anthony F.C. Wallace, St. Clair: A 
Nineteenth-Century Coal Town’s Experience with a Disaster-Prone Industry, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), 
Michael A. Amundson, Yellowcake Towns: Uranium Mining Communities in the American West (Denver: University Press 
of Colorado, 2004). 
the industry was “so essential to the life and interest of the local community.”7 Local 
residents were also in danger of flying rocks, as many family homes were located on this road 
that wound around the edges of the mine. The “moving” of a road was phase 1 of JM’s initial 
plans for development and expansion; phase 2 was coming quickly.  
 
In 1927, the population of Asbestos had grown to over 3,000 people, with the vast majority of 
residents employed at the Jeffrey Mine. The physical limits of the community needed to grow 
alongside this population, and the provincial government granted the town’s request to extend 
the borders of Asbestos by 17,588 feet. By this time, JM had become the community’s largest 
landholder after owning the Jeffrey Mine for just over ten years, and this distinction afforded 
it a significant amount of power over municipal affairs.8 As soon as the provincial 
government gave the town of Asbestos permission to extend its boarders to accommodate a 
growing population, JM requested 55 acres of the town’s total 800 acres in order to expand 
the Jeffrey Mine.9 This was, of course, in addition to the company supplying electricity to the 
community.  
 
Because it was an open pit, there were limits to what workers could reasonably and safely 
extract from the Jeffrey Mine: by 1928, the Jeffrey Mine resembled a steep inverted cone, 
rather than the spiralling circle it was soon after JM took over operations. Landslides were 
common, and extraction levels were shrinking because of a lack of physical space. Driving 
this landscape change was the fact that prices for asbestos were rising internationally, and 
Canada provided 85 percent of the global supply of the mineral: this was a massive industry 
and JM required unobstructed freedom to exploit the land at Asbestos, located in “the most 
important asbestos producing region in the world.”10 
                                                          
7 “si essentiel à la vie et l’intérêt de la communauté locale,” English translation by author, Procès-verbal, La ville 
d’Asbestos, 13 November 1923, p. 447. 
8 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 11 August 1927, p. 151, and 31 December 1928, p. 229 
9 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 27 April 1927, p. 137 
10 Asbestos: Its Sources, Extraction, Preparation, Manufacture, and Uses in Industry and Engineering (Berlin: Becker and 
Haag, 1928), p. 17 
 Quebec Asbestos Production as a Percentage of World Production of Asbestos, 1900-198311 
 
For the most part, the community could see that mine expansion was the logical next step. 
Workers did not want to continue working in an unsafe environment, and JM had promised to 
build new homes for all those whose houses would be destroyed by the pit expansion. These 
new homes would be located further away from the edges of the mine, and equipped with all 
the modern conveniences residents of Asbestos had yet to experience, including electricity 
and indoor plumbing.12 This was the type of municipal investment townspeople had been 
waiting for, as the community was transformed from a small mining town to an industrial 
centre. Of course, a major issue that nobody seemed to take notice of at the time was that 
while residents had owned their homes at the edge of the pit, they would not own these new 
ones. Instead, they would rent them from the company, making them more mobile and less 
legally—if not emotionally—attached to one specific place or building. 
 
                                                          
11 The Quebec data is based on data provided by the Reports on Mining Operations (1898-1936) and on the Mining Industry 
of the Province of Quebec (1937-2000) (http://www.mern.gouv.qc.ca/mines/desminesetdeshommes/index.jsp#annexe), 
compiled by Marc Vallières, and I have converted the short tons on the list to metric tons to more easily compare with the 
world data, which was provided by the United States Geological Survey, Circular 1298, Robert L. Virta, “Worldwide 
Asbestos Supply and Consumption Trends from 1900 through 2003, 2006 (http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2006/1298/c1298.pdf) 
p. 32-34. There is a discrepancy in the figure for 1922, which reads as 108% of global supply, which is obviously incorrect, 
although I have found no data to suggest which number is wrong, so I have left it as is. 
12 Réjean Lampron, Marc Cantin, and Élise Grimard, Asbestos: Filons d’Histoire, 1899-1999 (Asbestos: Centenaire de la 
ville d’Asbestos, 1999), p. 140. 
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Despite this underlying issue, JM quickly and efficiently destroyed these old homes as well 
as the entire original section of town, known to the local population as the “nerve centre” of 
the community.13 This was the first in a long line of largescale mine expansion in Asbestos, 
and amid promises of the company building a new commercial centre, Johns-Manville 
quickly and efficiently began to tear down a significant portion of the community, and put up 
the first barbed wire fence between the edges of the mine and town roads.  
 
For most in the community, it seemed that what was destroyed didn’t matter: what was 
important was that mine expansion ensured the town had a purpose, citizens would have jobs, 
and everyone would prosper. The destruction of the original section of town reinforced the 
idea that Asbestos was a place with a future, not a past, and the local population had to let go 
of the original bones of the community if it wanted to succeed, which it did. Not even the 
Great Depression hitting the community at the start of JM’s expansion efforts seemed to 
shake this conviction for most of the local population.  
 
The majority of townspeople worked at the Jeffrey Mine, or were closely connected to 
someone who did, and they believed in Johns-Manville with the same fervour that they 
believed in the Jeffrey Mine, even in the midst of the Depression. Because of its close ties to 
the automotive and manufacturing industries, JM was forced to shut down its operations 
between May 1932 and April 1933. This was a devastating time for the community of 
Asbestos, and many had to rely on government aid to feed their families during this period of 
economic crisis. However, the temporary mine closure taught the local population a valuable 
lesson on what life would be like in the community if JM was not given free reign to develop 
the mine as it wanted to. Townspeople developed a fresh understanding of the fact that this 
was the largest—if not the only—source of revenue in the town, and their faith in JM and in 
the Jeffrey Mine to bring them out of the Depression shaped future decisions they made 
locally about the use and governance of their land. 
 
There remained a small, yet vocal, segment of the town of Asbestos that disagreed with 
giving JM such great power: the community’s merchant class. Although their revenue was 
tied to the wages the majority of townspeople received from Johns-Manville, local merchants 
                                                          
13 Le Citoyen. 28 December 1974, p. 42. This phrase was also used in a 1967 article on the expansion of the Jeffrey Mine: 
W. Gillies Ross, “Encroachment of the Jeffrey Mine on the Town of Asbestos, Quebec,” Geographic Review, v. 57, n. 4 
(1967). 
refused to give the company carte blanche when it came to community development. Out of 
the over 3,000 people in Asbestos at the start of the 1930s, only eight officially protested the 
mine’s expansion. All of these eight were local merchants whose businesses would be 
affected by the reorganization of roads and neighbourhoods the expansion required, 
especially after the Depression hit and Jeffrey Mine workers could not pay their tabs. These 
merchants believed that in granting JM permission to destroy the centre of Asbestos, town 
council was acting in the interest of Johns-Manville, not the community.14 Despite this small 
faction disagreeing with the plans for mine expansion during a time of economic instability, 
when the mayor passed the matter onto the province for a final verdict, the government 
wholeheartedly agreed to it and passed a Bill of Expropriation to overrule any local protest. 
 
Because of its previous economic buoyancy, the government believed that the asbestos 
industry would be one of the major factors in the province’s emergence from the Depression, 
and it could not be stopped. Even if the mine destroyed segments of the community, it was 
simply far too important to the provincial economy to be limited by space. By the end of 
1933, the global demand for asbestos had increased by 71 percent, production had risen by 29 
percent, the Jeffrey Mine had been reopened, and local workers had returned to their jobs:15 it 
seemed like the sacrifice to both land and heritage had indeed been worth it, and townspeople 
had learned to trust JM’s expertise when it came to both local land and international markets. 
 
Extraction levels at the Jeffrey Mine did not reach pre-Depression levels until the industry 
boom that came with the Second World War, but local employees worked an average of 58 
hours a week by 1935, and could once again support their families. The hard years of the 
Depression were soon forgotten as Canadian production levels rose sharply in the second half 
of the 1930s, with 247,954 metric tons of raw asbestos being extracted in 1936, worth 
$9,958,183, and 337,443 metric tons worth $14,505,541 in 1937.16 While only five percent of 
the raw fibre was processed in Canada, most of the rest went directly to JM’s large network 
of processing plants in the United States.  
 
These high levels of production once again contributed to the Jeffrey Mine becoming 
unworkable, with its sides sloping sharply up, causing landslides and delays. JM appealed to 
                                                          
14 Le Citoyen, 28 December 1974, p. 70. 
15 Oliver Bowles and B.H. Stoddard, “Asbestos,” Minerals Yearbook 1934, Kiessling, O.E., ed. (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 1014. 
16 The Canadian Mining Journal, February 1938, p. 65. 
the municipal council in 1938 to expand its operations onto 14 undeveloped lots at the edge 
of the Jeffrey Mine, and the local government immediately granted the request.17 Local 
council also purchased 21 new lots of land from neighbouring farmers on which it could 
expand community living space as JM enlarged the Jeffrey Mine.18 This second expansion set 
a pattern in Asbestos that saw the town limits grow alongside those of the mine, all because 
of international market demand. By 1939, the Jeffrey Mine had become the largest chrysotile 
asbestos mine in the world,19 and it remained so for much of the 20th century because of the 
local commitment to industry growth over community land. At the start of the Second World 
War, workers at the Jeffrey Mine extracted an immense 3 million tons of rock and stripping 
each year from the 300 foot wide, 510 foot deep pit. 
 
Industry magazines like the Canadian Mining Journal fawned over the impressive operations 
at Asbestos, noting in 1939 that your first impression of the Jeffrey Mine was “one of size. 
Here is an operation that handles great quantities of material, and uses mammoth machines in 
the process. [Here] is the largest power shovel in Canada; along its levels run standard 
locomotives hauling trains of cars...Yet as one stands on the high side of the pit looking 
down, these great machines look like toys in that immensity of space.”20 There was real 
excitement surrounding the asbestos industry—and, in particular, the town of Asbestos—at 
the end of the 1930s, and its continuation seemed certain. Townspeople had yet to realize the 
effects this would have on local land, and the central role they were beginning to play in the 
global industry encouraged a real sense of pride in Asbestos.  
 
The mid-20thC was seen by industry leaders as the “Asbestos Age,” and the US Mineral’s 
Yearbook described it as being “indispensable to modern life” at the outbreak of the Second 
World War.21 Local labour, combined with American management, had made the Jeffrey 
Mine both a natural and technological phenomenon, and this international status further 
solidified the local devotion to the mine, the company, and the industry. This devotion was 
capitalized upon by the international industry during the Second World War. Shifts at the 
Jeffrey Mine ran 24 hours a day, seven days a week to ensure production levels met the 
                                                          
17 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 30 September 1938, p. 158. 
18 Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 3 January 1939, p. 182, and Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 3 April 1939, p. 210. 
19 RC Rowe, “Mining and Milling Operations of the Canadian Johns-Manville Company Ltd. at Asbestos, PQ,” The 
Canadian Mining Journal, April 1939, p. 185. 
20 Ibid, p. 194. 
21 Oliver Bowles and K.G. Warner, “Asbestos,” Minerals Yearbook, Herbert Hughes, ed. (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 1309. 
demands of the wartime and postwar market. Indeed, the majority of able bodied men living 
in Asbestos did not enlist in the military to serve in Europe, but instead stayed at home to 
work in the mine. Canadian asbestos production rose by more than 100,000 tons during the 
war partly because of these local efforts.22 
 
Asbestos-containing products, so popular in the First World War, became even more so 
during the 1940s as new technologies of both war and peace relied on the mineral for 
strength, durability, and protection from fire. The increase in extraction levels at the mine 
meant that the pit had once again come close to its physical limits within the town of 
Asbestos. In 1947 the Quebec industry exported 10,785,189 tons of fibre valued at 
$438,356,805 and by 1948, the Jeffrey Mine had grown to 3,200 feet long by 2,800 feet 
wide.23 Workers at the mine now extracted between 19,000 and 22,760 tons of rock every 24 
hours, compared to the 389,688 tons they had extracted per annum just ten years earlier.24  
 
A lengthy five month strike at the start of 1949 halted both local and global production of the 
mineral. When workers returned to the Jeffrey Mine in the spring, they were confronted with 
the fact that their local labour dispute had left the global industry with a shortage of 
approximately a quarter of a million tonnes of asbestos.25 While the Jeffrey Mine was only 
one of several Canadian asbestos mines, its sheer size and connections to the lucrative 
American market meant that its workers exercised significant control over the flow of raw 
asbestos internationally. Indeed, despite the strike, by 1950 Canada still controlled 61 percent 
of the global asbestos industry, worth $64 million.26 Because of the shortage, the market price 
for raw asbestos rose, and JM raised production targets at the Jeffrey Mine so it could 
maximize profits during this window of opportunity.  
 
Changing Opinions Both Locally and Globally 
 
                                                          
22 This figure refers to American tons, which are 2,000lbs. One of these new products was asbestos sheeting, invented in 
Britain, which was able to withstand extremely high temperature and pressure, suitable for both fighter jets and commercial 
airlines. Oliver Bowles and Dorothy I. Marsh, “Asbestos,” Minerals Yearbook, E.W. Pehrson and C.E. Needham, eds. 
(Washington: United States Printing Office, 1944), p. 1478. 
23 H.R. Rice, “The Asbestos Industry in Quebec,” The Canadian Mining Journal, October 1948, p. 148. 
24 Ibid. 
25 G.W. Josephson and F.M. Barsigian, “Asbestos,” Minerals Yearbook 1949, Allen F. Matthews, ed. (Washington: United 
States Printing Office, 1951), p. 139, and The Canadian Mining Journal, August 1949, p. 54. 
26 United States Geological Survey 1950 (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1951), p. 6. 
Raising production levels at a mine that had already reached its physical limits was a bold 
move. Workers extracted on average three times more asbestos at the Jeffrey Mine than their 
Canadian counterparts did, and landslides again became common. It was clear to everyone in 
the community that another expansion was necessary, but attitudes towards JM had changed 
during the lengthy strike of 1949, and the local population was less willing to sacrifice its 
land for the American company’s profits. Sensing this shift in local dynamics, instead of 
expanding the edges of the mine onto community land, JM instead developed a block-caving 
system that established shaft mines around the perimeter of the mine. These shaft mines 
allowed workers to extract a significant amount of raw asbestos without significantly 
infringing on municipal land. In fact, the only community members who voiced complaints 
about this new method were again local merchants, who were concerned the shafts would 
blur the boundaries between liveable space and workable space in the community too much. 
Indeed, the first shafts the company built lined Rue Bourbeau, which was the main 
commercial street in Asbestos. By 1952, each block was 200 square feet, had crushing plants 
816 feet below ground, and loading facilities 950 feet down.27 These efforts helped raise 
Canadian asbestos production from 61 percent in 1950 to 70 percent by 1952.28 
 
Rising production levels at the Jeffrey Mine helped workers become the highest paid miners 
in Canada during the 1950s. It also signalled to townspeople that despite the shaft mines 
surrounding the pit, the company would need to significantly expand its operations in the 
near future. The editor of the local paper wrote about this eventuality in 1956, stating that the 
global industry’s demands on the land in Asbestos meant that soon enough, the Jeffrey Mine 
will have consumed the entire community, and residents would be displaced to neighbouring 
towns due to a complete lack of liveable space.29 
 
Johns-Manville did not attempt to pacify local fears concerning future mine expansion. In 
fact, when it submitted an application to Asbestos Town Council at the end of the 1950s for a 
gradual, yet massive mine expansion, it also laid off 120 of its shaft mine employees because 
of new extraction technologies making them redundant.30 JM also cautioned town council 
against purchasing additional land for the community to grow onto once the expansion had 
                                                          
27 This information was taken from a USGS report on a 1952 visit to Asbestos to survey operations. United States 
Geological Survey 1952 (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1953), pp. III-2. 
28 Canadian Mining Journal, February 1952, p. 106. 
29 Le Citoyen, 26 July 1956, p. 2. 
30 Le Citoyen, 25 July 1958, p. 1 and 17 April 1959, p. 1. 
been completed, as it anticipated needing less, not more, employees in the future because of 
these new technologies. The company was not invested in the community of Asbestos, but 
rather its main natural resource, and it would not let sentiment inhibit profits.  
 
In a drastic shift from established practice, local residents—not just the local merchants—
began to refuse to sell their property near the mine’s edges to JM. If townspeople did not see 
direct benefits from the company’s expansion onto community land in terms of stable jobs 
and wages, they would prevent it in any way they could. In reality, there was little 
community members could do to limit the Jeffrey Mine’s growth: JM appealed for help to the 
provincial government in 1964, which passed another Bill of Expropriation.31 The industry 
was too important to the provincial and federal economy to limit its growth, and the 
government was not willing to challenge JM on its managerial practices as long as it was 
gaining substantial tax revenue from the company.  
 
Map of Asbestos showing the past and planned expansions of the Jeffrey Mine, 196732 
 
                                                          
31 Le Citoyen, 30 January 1964, p. 1. 
32 W. Gillies Ross, “Encroachment of the Jeffrey Mine on the Town of Asbestos, Quebec,” Geographic Review, vol. 57, no. 
4 (1967), p. 529. 
The inevitable expansion of the Jeffrey Mine was something most townspeople accepted, but 
local merchants were once again concerned about what it would mean for their businesses. A 
group of them appealed to the provincial government to reconsider the Bill of Expropriation 
on the grounds that their profits would be affected by the disruption the project would cause. 
However, the industry was worth over $148 million to the province, and JM had assured the 
government its planned expansion of the Jeffrey Mine would be worth over $20,000,000.33 
The merchants’ complaints were again dismissed, and the expansion went ahead, first 
consuming the main church in the community, then the main commercial district.  
 
By 1967, 250 buildings and 54 percent of the town centre had been consumed by the Jeffrey 
Mine.34 The local population could no longer recognize its community, but through working 
at the Jeffrey Mine, they supplied the global industry with over 600,000 tons of raw asbestos 
each year.35 Looking favourably on what JM had done to local land in its quest for more 
profit, the Canadian Mining Journal declared the community to be an impressive “industrial 
complex,” and the “Free World’s Largest Asbestos Producer,” which had gotten rid of all the 
tired old buildings that used to be present in the town.36  
 
Local land had indeed become part of a massive industrial complex, but what the journal 
failed to acknowledge were the effects this had on the local population living around the giant 
mine in the centre of town. By 1968, local residents began complaining that they were forced 
to “dine on dust and noise” because of the expansion, and they lobbied town council to 
establish a 1,000-foot buffer zone between the edges of JM property and community land.37 
With the help of JM funds donated for community development, council established this 
buffer zone and constructed a 200 foot long wall to restrict mine activities from impacting 
community life. This was a first in Asbestos, which had historically embraced the blurred 
lines between the mine and community land, and it demonstrated the real struggles the local 
population had keeping up with the global demand for the mineral that gave the town its 
name. Although employment at the Jeffrey Mine was not significantly rising, Asbestos had 
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run out of housing for its population, with a significant amount of homes being destroyed by 
the expansion.  
 
Town council had to appeal to the provincial housing association for help in building new 
homes to house local family, and it was a constant struggle to keep up with JM’s activities 
with the balance of land use that had previously been established by the company and 
community now lost. 
 
By examining the mine expansions in Asbestos, we can see an interesting shift occurring. In 
the early “boom” years of the asbestos industry, even during the Depression, the majority of 
local residents supported the idea that the town of Asbestos had a future, not a past, and 
everything in the community needed to be oriented towards this future. At the beginning of 
the 1970s, after their homes and businesses had been lost several times to JM’s expansion 
efforts, and when the negative health effects of the mineral became widely known and the 
industry began to collapse, the local belief in this future was profoundly shaken. 
Townspeople quickly became aware that they were facing a crisis much different in nature 
than the Depression, and suddenly, Asbestos only had its past to cling to.  
 
Johns-Manville knew the industry was in trouble during the 1970s—the company was in 
serious financial trouble too due to occupational health lawsuits filed against the company by 
its American workers—and officials attempted to get as much asbestos out of the Jeffrey 
Mine as they could before the industry completely collapsed. Although profits and demand 
for asbestos were dwindling, the global industry was still worth over $210 million by 1972, 
and JM set yearly extraction levels at the Jeffrey Mine to reach 700,000 tons by 1975, even as 
the company began laying off employees by the hundreds.38 This was an incredible target, 
and if achieved, would completely consume the town of Asbestos. Indeed, that same year JM 
informed 160 local residents that they had to move their homes in order to accommodate 
mine expansion, prompting the local paper to write, “But where can they go?”39  
 
Homes were already at risk of sliding into the pit, roads extending from the pit into the 
community were twisted and torn up as the Jeffrey Mine quickly, aggressively, and noisily 
expanded into the town. Rocks flew out of the mine and throughout the community as JM 
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increased blasting schedules and became more ambitious and extreme in its activities, and 
town council began closing key streets to ensure community safety.40 This was a 
community—and industry—in crisis.    
 
By 1977, townspeople had started describing JM’s activities at the Jeffrey Mine as “acts of 
vandalism,” as rocks continued to be blasted into the community from the pit, putting the 
local population at risk, especially as the 1,000 foot buffer zone that council had previously 
established was destroyed by mine development.41 Increased production at the mine had 
increased its size to 6,500 feet from east to west, 6,000 feet from north to south, and 1,000 
feet deep. As the company put its plans in motion to consume the land 200 locally-owned 
buildings were on, townspeople appealed to local council to do something to establish a safe 
distance between the community and the “cratère d’exploitation” the mine had become by 
1981.42  
 
It is significant to note that at the height of the western world’s awareness of the dangers the 
mineral posed to human health, the people of Asbestos, who lived and worked beside the 
largest asbestos mine in the world, were mainly concerned with protecting their homes from 
mine expansion, not their children from asbestos-related disease. Much of this was because 
JM-funded doctors had lied to local residents about the effects of asbestos on their health 
from the beginning of the company’s ownership of the mine, and this had a lasting impact on 
the way townspeople understood asbestos-related disease. Furthermore, as a community 
entirely dependent on the industry, the people of Asbestos knew it was the issue of health that 
was making it unstable. Keeping silent on this issue would perhaps help sustain the global 
industry and the local economy, but only if it did not cost townspeople their community. 
 
Local silence on the health effects of asbestos did not prevent the industry from crumbling 
and JM from declaring bankruptcy in 1982 due to the significant number of occupational 
health lawsuits it faced in the United States. The last time an owner of the Jeffrey Mine had 
declared bankruptcy was in 1892 with William H. Jeffrey, who had discovered the deposit, 
but had not fully understood it. The company sold the Jeffrey Mine to a group of its Canadian 
executives and left Asbestos in 1983 as the community began a period of instability and 
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uncertainty it has yet to emerge from. While activities at the Jeffrey Mine had recovered 
following this first bankruptcy as new owners brought fresh expertise to its operations, the 
shift in ownership during the 1980s was significantly different. Understanding this difference 
when reporting on the company’s bankruptcy, the local paper articulated townspeople’s 
concerns when it reported that without JM, Asbestos would collapse.43 
 
Johns-Manville had been the industry’s leader for decades, and no other company had the 
money or connections required to sustain a positive image of the mineral. Expansion plans 
into the town were halted by the mine’s new owners as the provincial and federal 
governments gave millions in subsidies and sought new markets in the developing world to 
sell Canada’s raw asbestos to. The population of Asbestos began to bleed out, shifts became 
limited to four or six months a year, and extraction levels dropped so sharply due to the 
diminished market demand for the dangerous mineral that expansion was not necessary for 
almost 20 years. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the industry in Asbestos continued until 2012, this was only because of these 
government subsidies and the local population’s sheer determination to prevent the 
community from collapsing. This is when we see a real crisis in the community of Asbestos 
develop, as it suddenly became a place without a future, and the past suddenly became the 
only think townspeople had to cling to. As willing or resigned as the local population was to 
allow mine expansion, they were powerless against the global collapse of the asbestos 
industry because of the mineral’s harmful effects on human health. 
 
The final proposal for the Jeffrey Mine to be expanded was proposed in 2010 by the 
conglomerate that owned the pit until its final closure and had a much different local 
reception than the resistance townspeople put up during the 1970s. This expansion was the 
community’s lifeline. Each of the previous eleven mine expansions in Asbestos had signalled 
to townspeople that business was booming and their jobs were secure. Although they did not 
always agree with the community destruction that came with these expansions, that was the 
positive constant throughout JM’s history in the town.  
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 The proposed expansion in 2010 was for different reasons. This was a last-ditch effort to get 
as much asbestos out of the Jeffrey Mine as the company could before the Canadian industry 
collapsed due to international pressure. New markets in places like China, India, and Mexico 
were hungry for the mineral for many of the same reasons the western world had historically 
desired it, but also because asbestos had become a relatively cheap commodity in global 
markets because of the risks it posed to human health. In countries without strict occupational 
health regulations, it remained a viable additive to building materials and domestic goods, 
despite the harm it did to the local population.  
 
While their absolute dependence on the industry—and therefore this final expansion—meant 
that nobody in Asbestos protested the proposed expansion, national and international anti-
asbestos lobby groups did. These groups often consisted of people who were suffering from 
asbestos-related disease from working with the mineral in other industries, and the family 
members of those who had died of asbestos-related disease, giving voice to the suffering the 
people of Asbestos could not bring themselves to articulate because of their dependence on 
the industry. The world now knows that asbestos is deadly, and while Canada was content 
selling the mineral to developing nations, the rest of the international community was not, 
once again having an impact on local land in Asbestos.  
 
Years of international shamming campaigns launched against Canada for its continued 
support of the industry, which included protest marches and demonstrations each year on 
Canada Day, resulted in a sudden change of plans for the proposed expansion. The voices of 
these external groups were louder than those of the people in Asbestos. The company 
cancelled the expansion plan, and both the federal and provincial governments that had been 
subsidizing the mine withdrew their support. Furthermore, the Canadian Cancer Society, 
which had previously attempted to suggest that Canadian asbestos was relatively safe, 
changed its position to more accurately state that all asbestos is dangerous to human health, 
causing the deaths of approximately 90,000 people each year.44 
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The Canadian Cancer Society provides financial support, group therapy, and palliative care to many community members 
dying of asbestos-related cancers. 
These recent events have left Asbestos in an uncertain state. After being so central to local 
identity, even during the massive mine expansion projects townspeople objected to, the land 
in Asbestos is now frozen, and the community’s future appears increasingly finite. This is 
difficult for a community who’s mantra had been that it was a place with a future, not a past, 
to understand. What remains true in Asbestos today is that the Jeffrey Mine continues to be a 
viable asbestos mine, if only they could work it, and markets in the developing world 
continue to seek the mineral, if only they could sell it. These ideas overlook the severe health 
effects the mineral has on human health, but also highlight an important aspect of resource 
communities: what happens to these places when the industry they rely on for their livelihood 
and identity collapses? How does a population reliant on the toxic land they live upon for 
stability reconcile the harm they do with the only way of life they have ever known? The 
extended life of the Jeffrey Mine—and the town of Asbestos—is over, and the community is 
no longer a place with a future, simply a past found at the bottom of a massive open pit mine. 
 
